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NOTE
NOT BY THE HAIR OF MY CHINNY CHIN CHIN:
OHIO'S ATTEMPT TO COMBAT THE BIG BAD WOLF OF
BLIGHT'
Justin M Lugart
I. INTRODUCTION
"There's no place like home," stated the First Appellate District in the Ohio
Court of Appeals, after announcing that the City of Norwood was legally
justified in appropriating private property for private development because it
was "deteriorating." 2 Seemingly falling in line with the recent United States
Supreme Court decision in Kelo v. City of New London,3 the appellate court in
Norwood deferred to the findings of the trial court and held that "the current
status of the law permits this kind of appropriation."4 Fortunately for the
owners, the Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed and reversed the appellate
decision, holding that the takings at issue violated the Ohio Constitution.
5
This Note argues that while the Ohio Supreme Court arrived at the correct
holding in Norwood, because of its failure to recognize that this case is at the
crux of current eminent domain issues, the court lost its opportunity to re-
establish the foundation of private property rights in Ohio and the nation at
large. In section II, this Note focuses on the background and the procedural
history of the Norwood decision. Section II also details the Ohio Supreme
Court's critical analysis of Kelo and provides an in-depth analysis of public use,
blight, and the void-for-vagueness doctrine under Ohio law. In section III, this
1. For those unfamiliar with childhood stories, this is a reference to the story of the Three
Little Pigs. See The Three Little Pigs in TELL-A-TALES (Ben Williams, illus. 1959). Basically,
the story explains that those who plan and create a strong foundation for their homes and for
their lives will be rewarded and strengthened against potential disasters. In the present case, this
story seems particularly relevant as Ohio has mandated that the property of its citizens should be
protected from government appropriation on the basis of economic utility.
t Managing Editor of Publication, Liberty University Law Review, Volume 2; J.D.
Candidate, 2008, Liberty University School of Law; B.A. Religious Studies, Focus in Tibetan
Buddhism/Tibetan Language, 2004, University of Virginia. I am eternally grateful to my
wonderful wife, Mrs. Cerid Lugar, who provided endless encouragement and honest critique. I
also thank the Liberty University Law Review staffand editorial board for thoughtful comments
and suggestions. Finally, I thank my parents and sister for all of their support along the way.
2. City of Norwood v. Homey (Norwood]), 830 N.E.2d 381 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005).
3. Kelo v. City of New London, 555 U.S. 469 (2005).
4. Norwood1, 330 N.E.2d at 383.
5. City of Norwood v. Homey (Norwood I1), 835 N.E.2d 1115, 1123 (Ohio 2006).
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Note provides a brief sketch of the foundational sources for private property
rights in the Western Legal Tradition.6 This Note emphasizes the importance of
understanding the development of private property rights by a historical
analysis beginning with Ancient Rome and concluding with Ohio's various
constitutional amendments. Within this discussion, the reader will find an
analysis of Blackstone's and Locke's differing views on the origin of private
property rights. Finally, section III concludes with an analysis of the Ohio
General Assembly's actions in the wake of Kelo and Norwood. Based on this
analysis, this Note concludes that if Ohio chooses to renew Senator Tim
Grendell's version of Senate Bill 167, including a limited definition of "blight,"
the state will be better equipped to combat the expansion and abuse of eminent
domain power.7
II. BACKGROUND: THE FOUNDATION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS
IN EQUIPOISE WITH THE OHIO TAKINGS CLAUSE
The city of Norwood is quite a unique place. Entirely surrounded by
Cincinnati, Norwood has retained its independence from annexation by the
larger metropolis.8 Once a vibrant and integral part of the greater Cincinnati
area, Norwood is now a wounded town that has suffered irreparable harm by
the demise of industrial America.9 Nevertheless, many people still call
Norwood home, hope to raise children and grandchildren there, and express a
desire to remain in the town until their last days.' 0 Unfortunately for some of
these homeowners, they must endure the uncertainty that their property may be
stripped away in the name of economic growth and municipal benefit.
Several years ago, homeowners in New London, Connecticut were faced
with the same problem." Unfortunately for the homeowners in New London,
6. The author is quite aware that even attempting to provide a brief sketch of the history of
private property rights in the Western Legal Tradition ("WLT") is a daunting, and essentially
impossible task. However, the author firmly believes it is possible to gain some insight into the
foundational theories and documents that support the "American" view of private property
rights. This better understanding of the WLT as applied to the various versions of the Ohio
Constitution and Senate Bill 167 is the purpose of this Note. In accordance with this
recognition, the author sincerely hopes that the reader will further investigate the sources
supplied in the following footnotes.
7. See infra, Part III: Section C.
8. NorwoodI, 830 N.E.2d at 384.
9. Id.
10. Norwood IT 835 N.E.2d at 1124 n.3 ("Appellants Carl and Joy Gamble lived in the
neighborhood for over 35 years before the appropriation").
11. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
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on June 23, 2005, the United States Supreme Court issued one of the most
controversial property opinions in the history of this nation. 2 By giving
deference to the Supreme Court of Connecticut, the plurality expanded the
meaning of the public use clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.1 3 The Court stated that because the "[city] plan unquestionably
serves a public purpose, the takings challenged here satisfy the public use
requirement of the Fifth Amendment.'
4
As a consequence, a municipality can constitutionally appropriate private
property not merely for public use, but for any public purpose regardless of
whether "the public end may be as well or better served through an agency of
private enterprise than through a department of government.' 15 Thus, the
Supreme Court altered the language of the takings clause of the Fifth
Amendment in two ways. First, the Court expanded the definition of the term
"public use" to the much broader "public purpose" terminology and supported
such an expansion by stating, "[w]ithout exception, our cases have defined that
concept broadly.' 6 Second, the Court explicitly stated that the takings clause
allows for the government to appropriate private property and pass such
property to a private entity for redevelopment, effectively redistributing private
property to those parties the government deems better suited to increase the
profitability of the land.1
7
Fortunately, because the Kelo decision was based on deference to the state
supreme court, the plurality in Kelo left the door open for each state to narrow
or broaden its power of eminent domain.18 The plurality stated, "We emphasize
12. Id. See generally Janet B. Baron, Winding Toward the Heart of the Takings Muddle:
Kelo, Lingle, and Public Discourse About Private Property, 34 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 613 (2007);
Michael A. Lang, Taking Back Eminent Domain: Using Heightened Scrutiny to Stop Eminent
Domain Abuse, 39 IND. L. REv. 449 (2006); Ryan J. Sevcik, Trouble in Fort Trumbull: Using
Eminent Domain for Economic Development in Kelo v. City of New London, 85 NEB. L. REv.
547 (2006). This list merely highlights a few articles characterizing the Kelo decision as
controversial. Shephardizing the case citation reveals 440 law review citations, 70 statutory
citations, and 67 treatise citations. Needless to say, Kelo is generally regarded as a controversial
opinion.
13. Id. Citing the Fifth Amendment, which reads in pertinent part "No person shall be...
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall privateproperty be
taken for public use without just compensation." U.S. CONST., amend V (emphasis added).
Justice O'Conner, in her dissent states, "the Court today significantly expands the meaning of
public use." Id. at 501.
14. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. at 484.
15. Id. at 486 (citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 34 (1954)).
16. Kelo v. City of New London, 455 U.S. at 480.
17. Id. at488.
18. Id. at 489.
2007]
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that nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing further restrictions
on its exercise of the takings power." 19 As a direct response to this invitation,
the Ohio General Assembly enacted Senate Bill 167 as sponsored by
Republican Senator Timothy Grendell.20 This legislation sought to ensure that
no private property in the State of Ohio could be taken for purely economic
gain by a private entity through local government.2 ' Section 8 of Senate Bill
167 states,
This act is hereby declared to be an emergency measure necessary
for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and
safety. The reason for the necessity is that the United States
Supreme Court decision in Kelo v. City of New London (2005), 125
S. Ct. 2655, could allow the taking of private property that is not
within a blighted area, ultimately resulting in ownership of that
property being vested in another private person in violation of
Sections 1 and 19 of Article I, Ohio Constitution, and, as a result,
warrants a moratorium on any takings of this type until further
legislative remedies may be considered.22
In accordance with the intent of Senate Bill 167, the General Assembly formed
a "Legislative Task Force to Study Eminent Domain and Its Use and
Application in the State" and instructed the task force to report its findings to
the General Assembly by August 1, 2006.23 While the Ohio legislature
investigated the role of eminent domain within the state in the wake of Kelo,
the courts in Ohio had to wrestle with the dilemma presented by the Norwood
case. Thus, to understand the importance of Senate Bill 167 and the legislative
task force, we must examine the facts and circumstances surrounding the Ohio
Supreme Court's decision in Norwood.
A. City of Norwood v. Homey: The Story of a "Deteriorating" Town
Founded in 1888, the city of Norwood has been a quintessential element of
Cincinnati's development.24 Buttressed by companies such as LeBlond
Machine Tool Company and the General Motors Assembly Plant, Norwood
19. Id.
20. Am. Sub. S.B. 167, § 4(A), Gen. Assem. (Ohio 2005) (on file with author).
21. NorwoodlI, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1122 (Ohio 2006).
22. Am. Sub. S.B. 167, § 8.
23. Am. Sub. S.B. 167, § 3(A).
24. City of Norwood, Department of Economic Development Homepage,
http://www.norwood-ohio.com/ed-index.html (last visited September 4, 2007).
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was once a haven for American industry. 25 However, beginning in the late
1960s and the early 1970s with the development of Interstate 71, the Norwood
homeowners' 26 neighborhood slowly transformed from single-family homes
into a predominately commercial area.27 As a result of these changes, the city
of Norwood observed the homeowners' neighborhood gradually transforming
into a hodgepodge of commercial and residential properties.28 In order to
alleviate inconsistencies in the city plan, the city of Norwood created the
Edwards Road Corridor Urban Renewal Area.
29
In 2002, a commercial developer, Rookwood Partners, Ltd. ("Rookwood"),
sought to redevelop the homeowners' properties for a private, commercial
shopping center called Rookwood Exchange. 30 The court of appeals described
the development by stating, "The project involved constructing a massive
conglomerate of stores and offices in place of the owners' properties."
31
Furthermore, this newly developed commercial property primarily appeals to
those of a substantially more fortunate socio-economic group who wish to shop
at high-end boutiques and dine at fine restaurants. 32 Because two-thirds of the
two million people that call Cincinnati home live within ten miles ofNorwood,
redevelopment like the Rookwood Exchange has created economic growth and
provided a substantial increase in revenue for the city.
33
Despite the obvious benefit to Norwood, the city itself expressed reluctance
to invoke the powers of eminent domain.34 Norwood wanted the developers to
purchase the land directly from the owners, but the owners refused to sell. 35
25. Norwood1, 830 N.E.2d 381, 384 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005).
26. The "homeowners" are also referred to as the "appellants" throughout this Note.
27. Norwood, 830 N.E.2d at 384.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Rookwood Commons & Pavilion Homepage, http://www.shoprookwood.com (last
visited September 4, 2007). It appears that Rookwood has built and developed a shopping
center called Rookwood Commons & Pavilion very near, if not actually on the property that this
case addresses. It is unclear at this time whether Rookwood Commons & Pavilion is a different
shopping center than proposed in 2002, or if it is the same plan with a different name.
Regardless, it seems quite clear that Rookwood was primarily in the business of developing
high-end shopping centers.
33. Norwood 11, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1124 (Ohio 2006) (stating that the "city expects the
redeveloped area to result in nearly $2,000,000 in annual revenue for Norwood").
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1124-25. The Supreme Court of Ohio noted that, "[the City of Norwood]
encouraged Rookwood to purchase the property through voluntary sales of homes and
businesses without the city's intervention... the appellants, however, refused to sell."
2007]
HeinOnline -- 2 Liberty U. L. Rev. 247 2007-2008
LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW
Accordingly, Rookwood appealed to the city of Norwood to exercise the power
of eminent domain and even offered to incur the cost of demolition of the
appropriated property.36  Norwood finally acquiesced and instituted
appropriation proceedings pursuant to the Norwood City Code."
After the city initiated the power of eminent domain, the first step in
appropriating the properties involved conducting "an urban-renewal study.,
38
Norwood, with funding from Rookwood, employed a consulting firm,
Kinzelman Kline Grossman ("KKG"), to conduct a study of the appellants'
properties. 39 KKG reported that "the neighborhood was a 'deteriorating area'
as that term is defined in the Norwood Code" and concluded that "the
neighborhood would continue to deteriorate."0 As a result of the KKG study,
numerous public hearings, and several town meetings, the Norwood City
Council approved the appropriation plan and authorized the mayor to contract
with Rookwood to redevelop the property.4' The city of Norwood thereafter
filed complaints with the trial court to institute the appropriation of the
homeowners' properties.42
During the trial, several employees of KKG offered conflicting testimony
regarding the nature and status of the appellants' properties; this nature and
status was a key issue in determining that the property was susceptible to
appropriation in the first place.43 The testimony of one KKG employee
concluded that the neighborhood "was neither a slum nor blighted or
36. Id. at 1125.
37. Norwood1, 830 N.E.2d 381,384-85 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (See also Norwood Code §
163.05).
38. Norwood11, 853 N.E.2d at 1125.
39. Id.
40. "Deteriorating area" under the Norwood Code § 163.02(c) is defined as:
an area, whether predominantly built up or open, which is not a slum, blighted or
deteriorated area but which, because of incompatible land uses, nonconforming
uses, lack of adequate parking facilities, faulty street arrangement, obsolete
platting, inadequate community and public utilities, diversity of ownership, tax
delinquency, increased density of population without commensurate increases in
new residential buildings and community facilities, high turnover in residential or
commercial occupancy, lack of maintenance and repair of buildings, or any
combination thereof, is detrimental to the public health, safety, morals and general
welfare, and which will deteriorate, or is in danger of deteriorating, into a blighted
area.
Id. at 1125 n. 5.
41. Id. at 1125-26.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1126.
248 [Vol. 2:243
HeinOnline -- 2 Liberty U. L. Rev. 248 2007-2008
NOT BY THE HAIR OF MY CHINNY CHIN CHIN
deteriorated and was not on its way to be becoming blighted.'"44 Despite this
testimony and other glaring errors in the KKG report, the trial court accepted
the study as in accord with the Norwood Code.45 The court held that although
the city of Norwood had abused its discretion in finding the appellants'
properties to be a "slum, blighted, or deteriorated area," the city had not abused
its discretion in determining that the neighborhood was a "deteriorating area.' A6
Accordingly, the court upheld the appropriation of the homeowners' property.47
On appeal, the homeowners raised five assignments of error, all of which the
court of appeals found unpersuasive under an abuse of discretion standard.48
The Supreme Court of Ohio, however, granted review and unanimously
reversed the decision.49 In an eloquent and engaging opinion, Justice Maureen
O'Connor provided a detailed overview of the history of eminent domain in
Ohio and its relation to Kelo, as well as a brief synopsis of the enactment
proceedings of Senate Bill 167.0 Additionally, the court held that the Norwood
Code's definition of "deteriorating area" was void-for-vagueness. The court
also upheld the constitutionality of Ohio Revised Code § 163.19, granting a
stay of the injunction awarded by the trial court, which would have allowed
Rookwood to demolish the property in the midst of the proceedings."
B. The Supreme Court of Ohio's Unanimous Decision: Public Use, Blight, and
Void-for- Vagueness
Justice O'Connor began the state constitutional analysis by addressing the
foundation and history of individual, private property rights.52 The majority
explained that private property rights are: "believed to be derived
fundamentally from a higher authority and natural law, property rights were so
sacred that they could not be entrusted lightly to 'the uncertain virtue of those
who govern."'' 53 The court's focus on the nature and foundation of private
property rights concluded that "Ohio has always considered the right of
44. Norwood I, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1126 (Ohio 2006). I am hesitant to define blighted at
this juncture despite resolution of this issue by the Ohio General Assembly. There are multiple
proposed definitions of "blight" that will be entertained in Section C of Part III of this Note.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Norwood1, 830 N.E.2d 381, 384 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005).
49. NorwoodfI, 853 N.E.2d at 1153.
50. Id. at 1127-43.
51. Id. at 1142-53.
52. Id. at 1128.
53. Id. (quoting Parham v. Justices of the Inferior Court of Decatur County, 9 Ga. 341,348
(Ga. 1851)).
2007]
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property to be a fundamental right., 54 Further, the court quoted Chief Justice
Bartley's opinion in Bank of Toledo, regarding the right of private property in
Ohio:
The right of private property is an original and fundamental right,
existing anterior to the formation of the government itself; the civil
rights, privileges and immunities authorized by law, are derivative --
mere incidents to the political institutions of the country, conferred
with a view to the public welfare, and therefore trusts of civil power,
to be exercised for the public benefit . . . Government is the
necessary burden imposed on man as the only means of securing the
protection of his rights. And this protection -- the primary and only
legitimate purpose of civil government, is accomplished by
protecting man in his rights of personal security, personal liberty,
and private property. The right of private property being, therefore,
an original right, which it was one of the primary and most sacred
objects of government to secure and protect, is widely and
essentially distinguished in its nature, from those exclusive political
rights and special privileges . . . which are created by law and
conferred upon a few... The fundamental principles set forth in the
bill of rights in our constitution, declaring the inviolability of private
property, were evidently designed to protect the right of private
property as one of the primary and original objects of civil society..
55
Having established a foundation for private property rights in the State of Ohio,
Justice O'Connor explained the modem approach to eminent domain in Ohio
and the shift in the Court's view of appropriations.
56
1. Reinforcing the Definition of Public Use
Despite the compelling clarity of Chief Justice Bartley's opinion, the
interpretation and application of the Ohio Constitution's takings clause has
drastically expanded since the adoption of the Northwest Ordinance in 1787. 57
54. Id. at 1129.
55. NorwoodlI, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1128-29 (Ohio 2006) (quoting Bank of Toledo v. City of
Toledo, 1 Ohio St. 622, 632 (Ohio 1853)).
56. Id at 1128-35 (providing a brief history of the development of eminent domain).
57. Id. Through the reading of the opinion in Norwood II, it is clear that the overall trend
of the interpretation of the takings clause has expanded drastically. Once a narrowly defined
clause, the takings clause has evolved into a broad understanding of general police powers and
public purpose. As will be explained in Section C of Part III, this expansion of the definition is
[Vol. 2:243
HeinOnline -- 2 Liberty U. L. Rev. 250 2007-2008
NOT BY THE HAIR OF MY CHINNY CHIN CHIN
It is clear that both the Northwest Ordinance and the Ohio Constitution
recognized the sovereign's ability to appropriate property; however, both
documents limited the government by requiring that the takings must be for
public use and the owners must be justly compensated. s As the Norwood court
highlighted, the issue ofjust compensation is rarely challenged, but both Ohio
courts and federal courts have explored the definition of public use numerous
times. 59 Perhaps the most important limitation on the definition of public use is
the presumption that "it has long been accepted that the sovereign may not take
the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another private party
B, even though A is paid just compensation. ' 60
More recently, even the presumption that the sovereign cannot pass property
from one private party to another has been nullified, so long as "there was no
evidence of an illegitimate purpose [on the part of the developer and local
government]. ' 61 Fortunately, the Supreme Court of Ohio recognized the
contradiction in this reasoning and instead adopted the reasoning of Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor's dissent in Kelo.62 The court referenced Justice
O'Connor's dissent by stating that "O'Connor correctly discerned in her
analysis of the taking in Kelo, when the state takes an individual's property and
gives it to another based solely on the economic gain afforded by the transfer,
the 'private benefit and [the] incidental public benefit are, by definition, merged
and mutually reinforcing."'
63
Based on this line of reasoning, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that
transferring property from one private party to another private party does not
satisfy the public use requirement because such a transfer is merely "an
economic or financial benefit."64 The court further opined that "eminent
domain is a power of last resort for the good of the public; it 'is not simply a
vehicle for cash-strapped municipalities to finance community
improvements."''6 5 Founded on an unambiguous rejection of the majority
position in Kelo, and on an acceptance of Justice O'Connor's dissent, the court
found that the appropriation in Norwood violated the takings clause of the Ohio
66Constitution.
unsupported by a much deeper history of eminent domain that traces back to pre-Roman law.
58. Id. at 1130-31 (citing, State ex rel. Bruestle v. Rich, 110 N.E.2d 778, 785 (Ohio 1953)).
59. Id. at n. 9 (citing United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 377 (1946)).
60. Id. at 1131 (citing Kelo v. United States, 545 U.S. 469, 476-77 (2005)).
61. Kelo v. United States, 125 U.S. 2655, 2661-62 (2005).
62. Norwood I, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1140 (Ohio 2006).
63. Id. (citing Justice O'Conner's dissent in Kelo, 545 U.S. 469, 494 (2005)).
64. Id. at 1143.
65. Id. at 1141.
66. Id. The Supreme Court of Ohio also explicitly accepts the reasoning of County of
2007]
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2. Norwood's Definition of Deteriorating Area: Too Vague To Survive
Having concluded that the takings instituted by the city ofNorwood violated
the Ohio Constitution's public use requirement, the Supreme Court of Ohio
shifted to the issue of whether the Norwood Code's definition of deteriorating
area was void for vagueness.67 In analyzing the issue, the court stated that the
test for the void-for-vagueness doctrine is "whether the law affords a reasonable
individual of ordinary intelligence fair notice and sufficient definition and
guidance to enable him to conform his conduct to the law; those laws that do
not are void for vagueness. 68
Regarding fair notice, the unanimous court reasoned that even though the
Norwood Code provides a plethora of factors that may tend to show that an area
is deteriorating, "the Norwood Code merely recites a host of subjective factors
that invite ad hoc and selective enforcement .... ,,69 Therefore, the appellants
in Norwood did not have fair notice of the various factors that could support a
finding of "deteriorating area" because the evidence consisted of contradictory
and conflicting opinions about the quality and status of the neighborhood.7 °
The court found that sufficient definition and guidance were also absent
from Norwood City's eminent domain statute. The court stated, "[t]he statutory
definition... incorporates not only the existing condition of a neighborhood,
but also extends to what that neighborhood might become .... [and] [s]uch a
speculative standard is inappropriate in the context of eminent domain .... ',7'
This definition includes not only the present state of the property as
deteriorating, but also gives the local government wide discretion to determine
that a property may deteriorate in the future.72 And as the Ohio Supreme Court
stated, such a standard is too speculative in appropriating private property under
the doctrine of eminent domain.73
Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (2004).
67. NorwoodII, 853 N.E.2d at 1142.
68. Id. at 1143 (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972)).
69. Id. at 1145.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Norwood l, 853 N.E.2d at 1145.
[Vol. 2:243
HeinOnline -- 2 Liberty U. L. Rev. 252 2007-2008
NOT BY THE HAIR OF MY CHINNY CHIN CHIN
III. ARGUMENT
THE HISTORY OF PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN LEGAL
TRADITION: THE ORIGINS OF OHIO SENATE BILL 167 AND ITS PROPER
APPLICATION
A. Brief History of the Sources of Public & Private Property Rights: From
Justinian to Madison
As the introduction and the argument heading state, the main purpose of this
Note is to craft a historical argument in favor of protecting private property
rights as natural rights that transcend the will or desire of one particular
government. Thus, in order to understand the unique status of private property
rights in the United States, and more specifically in Ohio after the decision in
Norwood and outlined in Senate Bill 167, we must briefly examine the major
sources that the Founding Fathers recognized and applied in the formative
documents of this nation. When attempting to tackle this daunting analysis,
some scholars immediately reference the great John Locke and his theory of
labor as the foundation of property rights in America.7 4 Others take the view
that private property rights have much older roots, roots that originate at the
very beginnings of Western civilization. 75 Although there are a variety of
viewpoints on the development of private property rights, there is a common
thread that connects many of these perspectives. This common thread is natural
law theory, which holds that the natural law is ingrained in the mind and heart
of each and every man, woman, and child.76 To track the development of
private property rights in the Western Legal Tradition, we must look to the
period of codification of laws under the Judeo-Christian worldview, namely
Justinian's Rome.
74. See generally Brett D. Liles, Reconsidering Poletown: In the Wake of Kelo, States
Should Move to Restore Private Property Rights, 48 ARIz. L. REV. 369 (2006).
75. See generally Timothy Sandefur, A Natural Rights Perspective on Eminent Domain in
California: A Rationale for Meaningful Judicial Scrutiny of "Public Use ", 32 Sw. U. L. REV.
569 (2003).
76. See generally ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA (1274); ST. AUGUSTINE OF
Hippo, Two CITIES (410); HUGO GRoTIus, DE JURE BELLI ET PACIS (1625); SAMUEL PUFENDORF,
ELEMENTA JURISPRUDENTIAE UNIVERSALIS (1673); and JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT (1690). This is hardly an exhaustive list of works on the natural law, but this list
provides a new reader with a good starting point. Though there are differences between each of
the authors' views of the natural law, the definition of natural law as the law "written on the
heart" of mankind can be regarded as a general definition.
2007]
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1. Justinian's Institutes and the Roman Divisions of Property
Under the Institutes of Justinian, the division of ownership of property is
twofold: those things that may be owned by an individual and those things that
cannot.7 Those types of property that an individual cannot own are further
divided into four subcategories. 78 The Institutes of Justinian elaborate on these
types of property that "consist of things that belong to all men in common (res
communes); of things that belong to the state (res publicae); of things that
belong to a corporation (res universitatis); and of things that belong to no one
(res nullius).' 79
Having acknowledged the various divisions of property, Justinian further
stated some examples of public property (respublicae) that were owned by the
Roman people as a whole. s Justinian's examples clarify that "[p]ublic property
is represented by rivers, harbors, and public roads ... they belong to the Roman
people ... the use being in the public at large., 81 Accordingly, one may
conclude that Roman law gives us an early example of the types of property
that could be held publicly. Also, "the use being in the public at large" seems
to provide some foundation for the later public use requirement for municipal
takings.82 Though the connection is not direct, the Institutes of Justinian lay the
foundation for later elaborations on public and private property in the Western
Legal Tradition.
2. King John's Magna Carta: The First Codification of Private Property
Rights
Though much time passed between the foundational contribution of
Justinian's Institutes and June of 1215, for purposes of this limited Note, the
next seminal event in the historical development of public and private property
rights came by way of King John's Magna Carta.83 The Magna Carta states
that
77. WILLIAM L. BuRDIcK, THE PiudNC'LEs OF ROMAN LAw AND THEIRRELATION TO MODERN
LAW 307 (The Law Book Exchange, Ltd. 2003) (1938). (This division is more commonly
understood as the division between private property and public property).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. BOYD C. BARRINGTON, THE MAGNA CHARTA AND OTHER GREAT CHARTERS OF ENGLAND
WITH AN HIsTORICAL TREATISE AND Copious EXPLANATORY NoTEs 228-50 (Fred B. Rothman &
Co. 1993) (1900).
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No free-man shall be seized, or imprisoned, or dispossessed, or
outlawed, or in any way destroyed; nor will we condemn him, nor
will we commit him to prison, excepting by the legal judgment of
his peers, or by the laws of the land. 4
The Magna Carta is considered by many to be at the very root of British, and
eventually, American common law.85 According to Thomas Cooley, the
Magna Carta was "the first great statute, promulgated at a time when the
legislative power was exercised by the king alone.... , 86 Thus, the right of a
free man to have exclusive rights and possession in his land, free from the will
of the sovereign, was statutorily recognized in 1215.87 This recognition of
private property ownership as paramount to the will of the legislature was a
crucial step in the development of public and private categories of ownership.88
Accordingly, it is critical to evaluate the impact of the codification of the
common law of private property rights over the following centuries. The next
seminal figure, Hugo Grotius, expanded and elaborated upon the provisions of
the Magna Carta, providing an organized codification of, and commentary on,
property law in the early period of the Western Legal Tradition.
3. Hugo Grotius: Moving Toward the Modem Framework
Much like the Roman divisions of property, Grotius expounds that "[t]his
division, of the suum, reveals two parts: 'some things belong to us by a right
common to mankind, others by our individual right." 89 Grotius proclaims that
the origin of property lay in the notion of community property which mankind
was able to appropriate for his own use. 90 However, mankind was limited to
84. Id. at 239 (specifically Article 39).
85. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 169 (1998).
Amar states, "[t]hese English documents [Magna Charta, Petition of Right, the Habeas Corpus
Act, the English Bill of rights of 1689] were the fountainhead of the common law and the
acknowledged forebears of many particular rights that later appeared in the federal Bill,
sometimes in identical language."
86. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITuTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 23 (The Lawbook
Exchange, Ltd. 2002) (1868).
87. Id.
88. Timothy Sandefur, Public Use: Returning to the Sources 2 (Feb. 4,2005) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid
=656004 (last visited September 4, 2007).
89. STEPHEN BUCKLE, NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF PROPERTY: GROTIUS TO HUME 35
(2002) (citing De Jure Belli ac Pacis, II. 2. II. 3).
90. Id. at 36.
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appropriating only as much as one needed for survival.91 As one scholar
explains, "Grotius is thus committed to holding that at least the first purpose of
private ownership was to protect the things or actions necessary to
preservation-in other words, to satisfy needs." 92 However, Grotius does not
dismiss the fact that there are many other reasons for owning property, but
ownership of private property must at the very least satisfy the element of
preservation.
93
Although Grotius recognizes a limitation on ownership by means of basic
preservation, there is no specific line or moment in time that marks the
transition from common ownership to private ownership. Rather, the
"undifferentiated use-right in the earth is... transformed by agreement or
division into the territories of first, nations, and secondly, households." 94 Once
mankind transforms the use-right in the earth in a formal division of nations, it
becomes apparent that a sovereign must promulgate and uphold laws.95
Following the framework established by the Magna Carta, Grotius left an
indelible mark in the world of property law by coining the term "eminent
domain." 96 In the De Jure Belli et Pacis, Grotious stated that, "a king can...
take away from his subjects [property] ... by the power of eminent domain. ' 97
Grotius further contends that the state must satisfy two requirements to
appropriate property.9" First, "the public welfare must require it, and second,
compensation must be made to the loser, if possible, from the public funds."99
Here, Grotius provides the terminology that is employed today, coupled with a
clear and largely unchanged framework for evaluating the exercise of eminent
domain. 00
4. The Great Locke: Labor Theory and the Origin of a Fundamental Right
While Grotius provided a thorough framework and useful terminology, John
Locke's theories shaped much of American property law.'01 Much like his
91. Id.
92. Id. at 37.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 41.
95. BUCKLE, supra note 89, at 41.
96. Sandefur, supra note 75, at 571 (citing HUGO GRoT1us, 2 THELAW OF WARAND PEACE7
(L. Loomis, trans., 1949) (1625)).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Liles, supra note 74.
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fellow natural law scholar Grotius, Locke held that God gave to man a common
dominion over the land of the earth. 10 2 However, Locke's major contribution is
his theory of labor, which became the archetype for the natural law foundation
of private property rights as found in the United States Constitution.
10 3
According to Locke's labor theory, "as much land as a man tills, plants,
improves, cultivates, and can use the product of, so much is his property... he
by his labour does, as it were, enclose it from the common."' 4 This labor, as
commanded by the Divine, 10 5 is the means by which mankind subdued the earth
and acquired first possession of property.10 6 Because the Divine has
commanded mankind to put his labor into the earth, mankind must also take the
necessary steps to form a civil government to ensure the protection of private
property.10 7 As Locke states, "the great and chief end... of men's uniting into
commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation
of their property."' 08 Thus, according to the words of Locke himself, civil
government's primary purpose is the protection of private property rights, both
real and personal, as obtained by means of one's labor. 109
5. Blackstone: The Common Law View of Private Property Rights
Another oft-cited legal scholar, William Blackstone, is best known for his
compilation of the British common law entitled Commentaries on the Laws of
England.110 In Book II of Commentaries, Blackstone devotes 520 pages to the
history and development of property rights in England.11 As an initial
observation, Blackstone's dedication of an entire volume to the rights of
102. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT & A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION
113 (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1690). For a more thorough understanding of
Locke, see also JOHN LOCKE, ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF NATURE AND ASSOCIATED WRITINGS (W.
von Leyden, ed., 1954) (2002).
103. Sandefur, supra note 75, at 576.
104. LOCKE, supra note 102, at 113. See also, BUCKLE, supra note 89, at 149-61.
105. This term, "the Divine" will be used interchangeably with the term "God" to convey
Locke's and Blackstone's understanding of the Western notions of divinity (i.e., the Western
notion of a divine Creator that presides over mankind and is the source of all things).
106. LOCKE, supra note 102, at 113.
107. Id. at 54-64. This passage includes a theme that is developed through Locke's Treatise;
namely, that Hobbes' state of nature is a valid presumption, but Locke holds that God is the
creator and king of the earth and that the life of man is not necessarily "solitary, poor, nasty,
brutish, and short." THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 76 (Edwin Curley, ed., 1994) (1668).
108. LoCKE, supra note 102, at 124.
109. Id.
110. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES.
111. Id.
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property, at the very least, indicates the value that the common law placed on
private property rights. And much like Locke, "[Blackstone] claimed that
[private property] had arisen out of necessity, in that as people multiplied upon
the earth there was not enough land and things to meet every person's need."'"
12
Accordingly, "both [Locke and Blackstone] cited passages from the book of
Genesis dealing with conflicts over property."'" 3  However, Locke and
Blackstone expressed differing views on the common law foundation of
exclusive possession." 4 Unlike Locke, Blackstone propounded that the so-
called "first taker" of property became the owner and possessor of property
merely because of his status as the first in time." 5 Additionally, Blackstone
held that there was "nothing inherently right in the first taker's claim," and "he
concluded that the common law of property was a matter of societal convention,
not a matter of natural right."
'
"
6
6. Blackstone v. Locke: Which Position Prevailed?
This divergence of opinion on origins between Locke and Blackstone is at
the core of understanding the development of private property rights in the
United States. On the one hand, both Blackstone and Locke cite the same
foundational sources and both view the development of private property as a
historical progression. "17  On the other hand, the two come to different
conclusions regarding the essence of the right to own property."8 Locke
concludes that private property rights are natural rights that are founded in
God's gift of "reason to make use of it [property] to the best advantage of life
and convenience."'1 9 This gift of reason, coupled with mankind's labor, led
Locke to propound that mankind has a natural right to hold private property for
his own use at the exclusion of all others. 20 Blackstone, however, surmised
that the ownership of private property was not a natural right; rather, the ability
to own property derived from a societal convention, which recognized that in
order to protect civility, the sovereign had to protect each person's private
112. Herbert W. Titus, God's Revelation: Foundation for the Common Law, 4 REGENT U. L.
REv. 1, 23 (1994) (citing Locke, supra note 102, at 18, 23-24; citing BLACKSTONE, Supra note
110, at *5-6).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. LOCKE, supra note 102, at 18, 23-24; see also BLACKSTONE, supra note 110, at *5-6.
118. Titus, supra note 112.
119. LOCKE, supra note 102, at 111.
120. Titus, supra note 112, at 24.
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property interest from others. 121 The question thus arises as to which
perspective is correct, or more directly put for purposes of this Note, which
theory is at the foundation of the American view of private property rights.
Perhaps the answer to this inquiry is found in the words of Thomas Jefferson
from the year 1826.122 In a letter to James Madison, Jefferson stated that "the
honied Mansfieldism of Blackstone became the student's hornbook, from that
moment, that profession (the nursery of our Congress) began to slide into
toryism, and nearly all the young brood of lawyers now are of that hue. 12 3
Unlike Blackstone, Jefferson and Madison recognized that there are certain
inalienable and natural rights that supersede the sovereign's power.'
24
According to Madison, "[g]overnment is instituted to protect property of
every sort; as well that which lies in the various rights of individuals, as that
which the term particularly expresses.., this being the end of government, that
alone is a just government, which impartially secures to every man, whatever is
his own . .,,125 This language echoes Locke's view that the sovereign's
greatest duty is to protect the natural right to own private property. 26 This
view, however, is not necessarily opposed to Blackstone's view of the purpose
of government even though Blackstone regards the development of private
property as a societal convention. 127 In Book I of Commentaries, Blackstone
states, "so great moreover is the regard of the law for private property, that it
will not authorize the least violation of it; no, not even for the general good of
the whole community."' 128 As a result, one may conclude that Blackstone,
Locke, Jefferson, and Madison all agree that protection of private property is a
fundamental object of government, though the status of private property as a
natural right is still debatable.
121. Id.
122. Sandefur, supra note 75, at 582. The author is quite aware that the year 1826 is much
later than the actual composition of the Bill of Rights in which Madison so earnestly
participated. Though this letter occurs much later, it does provide insight into the views of
Jefferson regarding the negative impact, in his opinion, of Blackstone's views.
123. Id. (quoting Letter to James Madison (Feb. 17, 1826), reprinted in Jefferson: Writings,
at 1512 (M. Peterson ed., 1984)).
124. Sandefur, supra at note 75, at 583.
125. JAMES MADISON, PROPERTY AND LIBERTY (1792), reprinted in TE COMPLETE MADISON:
His BASIC WRITINGS 267-68 (Saul K. Padover, ed., 1953). I am aware that this was not
published until 1792, three years after the ratification of the U.S. Constitution. Though this
excerpt seemingly breaks the chronological approach of this Note, this quote embodies
Madison's view of private property and the crafting of the 5th Amendment.
126. LOCKE, supra note 102, at 155.
127. Titus, supra note 112.
128. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *117, 135.
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7. The Northwest Ordinance: Ohio's First Organic Law
Although the nature of private property rights may be unsettled, one may
still gain an understanding of the development of private property rights in
America by analyzing the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. Eleven years after
Jefferson penned the Declaration of Independence and four years after the
United States finally achieved her sovereignty under the Treaty of Paris, the
Continental Congress of the United States, under the authority of the Articles of
Confederation, adopted the Northwest Ordinance. 129 This Northwest Ordinance
effectively established the rule of law for the northwestern territories and is
regarded as "one of the organic laws of the United States .... ,,130 The Article
of the Second sets forth the law concerning the writ of habeas corpus, trial by
jury, proportional representation, capital offences, and directly addresses the
importance of private property.' 3' The provision states,
[N]o man shall be deprived of his liberty or property but by the
judgment of his Peers, or the law of the land; and should the public
exigencies make it necessary for the common preservation to take
any persons [sic] property, or to demand his particular services, full
compensation shall be made for the same; --and in the just
preservation of rights and property it is understood and declared,
that no law ought ever to be made, or have force in the said territory,
that shall in any manner whatever interfere with, or affect private
contracts or engagements, bona fide and without fraud previously
formed. 1
3 2
In line with Jefferson's focus on inalienable rights, Article of the Second of the
Northwest Ordinance gives a preview of the language of the United States
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. 33 Though much of the provision focuses
on the rights of the criminally accused, the second half of the article focuses
primarily on private property rights and the limited circumstances in which the
government may appropriate private property. 34 Additionally, the specific
reference to "public exigencies" indicates that the authors of the Article of the
Second sought to "distinguish between public use and public necessity (or
129. THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE 1787: A BICENTENNIAL HANDBOOK xv-xviii (Robert M.
Taylor, ed. 1987) [hereinafter THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE].
130. Sandefur, supra note 75, at 574.
131. THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE, supra note 129, at 59-60.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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convenience) [which was] incorporated into early American law."' 35 This
distinction becomes critical at a later point in the historical development of
property law. The most effective means of understanding the problem,
however, hinges on a proper appreciation of the Bill of Rights. More
specifically, we must shift focus to the Fifth Amendment and its impact on
private property rights.
8. Madison's Fifth Amendment: The Current Language of Eminent
Domain
As the sole author of the takings clause to the Fifth Amendment, James
Madison understood the gravity of public appropriations of private property and
valued the natural right to pursue, purchase, and maintain private property.
136
Madison, aware of the dangers of an unchecked sovereign, sought to prevent
the abuses of powers by the British crown that plagued early Americans.
137
Though majority rule is a hallmark of democratic government, Madison was
especially wary of factions and the unchecked will of a majority. 38 In
Federalist No. 10, he states,
When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular
government... enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest
both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the
public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction,
and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular
government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are
directed.
139
Here, Madison unequivocally warns of the potential abuses of power that have
the ability to corrupt and overthrow any democratic government that is formed
upon factions.140 The only means of controlling faction, in the eyes of
Madison, was to establish an American republic as opposed to a pure
democracy. 141 Further, Madison recognized that "the diversity in the faculties
135. Sandefur, supra note 75, at 574.
136. HARRY N. SCHEIBER, The "Takings" Clause and the Fifth Amendment: Original Intent
and Significance in American Legal Development, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING
AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDING 234 (Eugene W. Hickok, Jr. ed., 1991).
137. Saul K. Padover, Introduction to THE COMPLETE MADISON: HIS BASIC WRITINGS 13
(1953).
138. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
139. Id.
140. Id. (See also Sandefur, supra note 75, at 585-93).
141. Id.
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of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable
obstacle to a uniformity of interests.., the protection of these faculties is the
first object of government. ' 42 As a result of these concerns and to counter the
evils of faction, Madison was an ardent supporter of the Bill of Rights and
exclusively provided the language for the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. 143 This amendment was modeled largely on the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787 and on various state declarations of rights and
constitutions. 44
The language of the Fifth Amendment proclaims that "No person shall...
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.''145
Though Madison sought to prevent the state from being able to appropriate
private property under the two-fold condition of public use and just
compensation, the Fifth Amendment was not officially incorporated in the
states until 1896 in Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Nebraska.146 As a result,
each state determined its own procedures and the scope of eminent domain.
1 47
142. Id.
143. SCHEiBER, supra note 136, at 236.
144. Id. (See also VA. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 6 (1776), in 7 FRANCIS NEWTON THORPE, THE
FEDERAL AND STATE CoNSTITuTIoNs, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE
STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES Now OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 3813 (1909) (stating, "all men... cannot be... deprived of their property for public
uses without their own consent ...."); see also VT. CONST. art. 1, §2 (1777) (stating "[tihat
private Property ought to be subservient to public Uses when Necessity requires it; nevertheless,
whenever any particular Man's Property is taken for the Use of the Public, the Owner ought to
receive an Equivalent in Money.").
145. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
146. SCHEMER, supra note 136, at 239. See also Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164
U.S. 403 (1896). In 1868, Congress adopted the Fourteenth Amendment which initiated the so-
called "incorporation doctrine" whereby the federal bill of rights became binding upon state
governments. The takings clause of the Fifth Amendment finally became "officially" binding on
state governments in Missouri Pac., although most states already had similar language in their
individual state constitution. The quote in Missouri Pac. stated, "[t]he construction so given to
the statute [Nebraska Eminent Domain Statute] by the highest court of the state must be
accepted by this court, in judging whether the statute conforms to the constitution of the United
States." Id. at 414. Thus, the Supreme Court in Missouri Pac. first stated that the statute at
issue must adhere to the language of the U.S. Constitution. Later in the opinion, the Court took
the line of reasoning to the next level, effectively incorporating the Fifth Amendment to the
states by means of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court explicitly stated, "[t]he taking by a
State of the private property of one person or corporation, without the owner's consent, for the
private use of another, is not due process of law, and is a violation of the Fourteenth Article of
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States." Id. at 417.
147. SCHEMER, supra note 136, at 239.
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Such state conceptions of the power of appropriation included the view that the
term "public use" was an affirmative limitation on the government's ability to
take property, and not merely a "tautological phrase.'
' 48
B. Ohio's Take on the Takings Clause: The Sources and Presuppositions of
Inviolability in the Ohio Constitution
As stated previously, one of the functions of the Northwest Ordinance of
1787 was to provide the Northwest Territories with the formal concepts and
procedures necessary to protect private property from certain types of
governmental intrusion.149 In effect, the Northwest Ordinance was "much more
stringent than what is found in the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment [to
the United States Constitution]."' 5  Accordingly, when Ohio solidified
statehood in 1803, the framers of the Ohio Constitution were sure to include a
rigid takings clause, which embodied the letter and the spirit of the Northwest
Ordinance that had served the territory well for the previous sixteen years.'51
Following the Enabling Act of 1802, the founding fathers of Ohio
completed the first constitution in that same year. 152 This first constitution
recognized "that all men are born equally free and independent, and have
certain natural, inherent, and unalienable rights, amongst which are the
enjoying and defending life and liberty, [and] acquiring, possessing, and
protecting property."'153 Thus, the Ohio Constitution echoed the language of the
Declaration of Independence, United States Constitution, and the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787.154 Additionally, the original Ohio Constitution addressed
the issue of eminent domain in Article VIII, section 4.155 This provision stated,
"[p]rivate property ought and shall ever be held inviolate, but always
subservient to the public welfare; provided a compensation in money be made
to the owner.' 56 Once again, the framers of the Ohio Constitution mirrored the
language of the federal constitution and the Northwest Ordinance.
Additionally, section 4 of the Schedule provided that all prior laws, including
148. Id. at 240.
149. THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE, supra note 129, at 59-60.
150. SCHEMER, supra note 136, at 237.
151. OHIO CONST. art. VIII, § 4; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 19.
152. See generally OHIO CONST. (1802).
153. OHIoCoNST. art. VIII, § 1 (1802).
154. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); U.S. CONST. (1789); THE
NORTHWEST ORDINANCE, art. 11 (1787).
155. OHIo CONST. art. VIII, § 4 (1802).
156. Id.
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the Northwest Ordinance, shall continue to govern so long as the laws do not
contradict the letter or spirit of the Ohio Constitution.
157
In 1850, Ohio held a constitutional convention to examine the viability of
the 1802 version and decided to propose a new constitution for ratification. 5 '
Under the new 1851 version of the Constitution, Article I contains the Bill of
Rights, which includes the clause on natural and inalienable rights as well as a
newly worded takings clause.159 The eminent domain clause is much more
specific than the 1802 version and provides:
Private property shall ever be held inviolate, but subservient to the
public welfare. When taken in time of war, or other public
exigency, imperatively requiring its immediate seizure or for the
purpose of making or repairing roads, which shall be open to the
public, without charge, a compensation shall be made to the owner,
in money, and in all other cases, where private property shall be
taken for public use, a compensation therefore shall first be made in
money, or first secured by a deposit of money; and such
compensation shall be assessed by a jury, without deduction for
benefits to any property of the owner. 160
Facially, the 1851 version of the inviolability provision is much more thorough
and much more specific. This facial alteration of the 1851 inviolability
provision is particularly interesting in two ways. First, the drafters of the 1851
version placed the takings clause at the forefront of all constitutional provisions
in the Bill of Rights contained within the first article. 161 Thus, the takings
clause, in the view of the 1851 drafters, was so vital to governance that it was
unearthed from deep within the 1801 Constitution (Article VIII). Second, the
1851 version is much more thorough and provides specific language that
provides for various exceptions to the general rule of inviolability. 62 This
detailed, specific language evinces the fact that the 1851 framers recognized the
origins of the takings clause and sought to address the overly general 1801
provision. As a result of the diligence of the 1851 drafters, and despite an
attempt to re-write the Ohio Constitution in 1874, the 1851 version reigned
157. Oio CONST. Schedule, § 2.
158. O11o CONST. (1802).
159. OHIoCONST. art. I, § 1, 19.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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supreme until November 16, 2005 when the Governor signed Senate Bill 167
of the 126th General Assembly into law.1
63
C. Senate Bill 167." Moratorium on Kelo Appropriations
Republican Senator Timothy Grendell sponsored Senate Bill 167, an
emergency measure specifically tailored to address the threat of expansion of
eminent domain power under United States v. Kelo.164 The synopsis of Senate
Bill 167 establishes:
Until December 31, 2006, a moratorium on the use of eminent
domain by any entity of the state government or any other political
subdivision of the state to take, without the owner's consent, private
property that is in an unblighted area when the primary purpose for
the taking is economic development that will ultimately result in
ownership of the property being vested in another private person,
[and] to create the Legislative Task Force to Study Eminent Domain
and Its Use and Application in the State, and to declare an
emergency.1
65
Not only did Senate Bill 167 establish a moratorium on Kelo-type takings, but it
also formed a legislative task force to research and report on the history of
eminent domain in Ohio.
The goal of the task force was to provide recommendations for the General
Assembly in dealing with the issue addressed in Norwood.166 One of the
central sub-issues on which the task force focused was the purpose of
classifying certain property as blighted. 67 The task force concluded that the
Norwood court directly addressed this issue and suggested that "Ohio law does
need to clearly define 'blight' in order to permit a taking by eminent domain
... [and] because blight has been and is a subjective term and difficult to define
qualitatively, it can be interpreted to include property that some may not
perceive to be blighted.'
' 68
As a result of the Norwood court's mandate regarding the definition of
blight, the legislative task force proposed a majority and minority opinion of the
163. Am. Sub. S.B. 167, Gen. Assem. (Ohio 2005).
164. Id. § 8.
165. Am. Sub. S.B. 167, Gen. Assem. (Ohio 2005).
166. LEGIs. TASK FORCE, 126TH GEN. ASSEM., Study on Eminent Domain, Final Report
(2006) (obtained from the office of Sen. Timothy Grendell) (on file with author).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 12 (under the heading Definition of Blight: Majority Task Force
Recommendation).
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proper definition of blight.'69 Before addressing each of these proposed
definitions, it is imperative to briefly comment on the historical development of
the use of blight as a foundation for the exercise of eminent domain. Though
the Ohio Constitution of 1802 and of 1851 do not directly refer to the term
blight, it is clear that concept of taking blighted property by means of municipal
appropriation was an integral part of John Locke's labor theory of property.
170
In Locke's Second Treatise, he explains the idea of blight by stating, "if either
the grass of his enclosure rotted on the ground, or the fruit of his planting
perished without gathering and laying up; this part of the earth, notwithstanding
his enclosure, was still to be looked on as waste, and might be the possession of
any other.' 17' Clearly then, Locke's labor theory of property took into account
the situation in which a private landowner lays waste to his property, an act that
essentially amounted to forfeiture of that section of property.
In recognition of this waste/blight theory as expounded by Locke, courts
across the United States, and more specifically in Ohio, sought to counter the
trend of urban decay following the mass exodus to the suburbs in the 1950s and
1960s. 172 As a result, "these modem urban-renewal and redevelopment efforts
fostered the convergence of the public-health police power and eminent
domain."' 173 At this juncture in the development of government takings, it is
critical to note that the essential nature of the takings clause of the Ohio
Constitution reached its most outward limit of interpretation. As the Norwood
Court opined, "[r]ather than furthering a public benefit by appropriating
property to create something needed in a place where it did not exist before, the
appropriations power was used to destroy a threat to the public's general
welfare and well-being: slums and blighted or deteriorated property."'174
The Norwood court, however, characterizes this expansion as unsupported
by tradition and instead states that, "the concept of public use was altered [from
its origins].' 75 Despite this misapplication of the takings clause by destruction
of property in the mid-twentieth century, the court in Norwood recognized that
any taking based on blight falls within the black letter of the public use
requirement, and therefore, is constitutional.
176
169. Id. at Attachment 2. (Majority recommendation, R-126-3937). Id at Attachment 3.
(Minority recommendation, RC 126-3899).
170. LocKE, supra note 102, at 116-17.
171. Id. at 116.
172. NorwoodI1, 835 N.E.2d 1115, 1134 (Ohio 2006).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1135.
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Accordingly, as both the legislative task force and the Norwood court
recognized, a proper definition of blight is at the root of ensuring that the power
of eminent domain cannot be abused. As Senator Grendell submitted, "Ohio
should adopt a statewide definition of blight, defined by objective standards
and subject to heightened scrutiny... subjective standards (e.g. "deteriorated")
should not be used as such standards can lead to potential abuse of eminent
domain powers (e.g. Lakewood, Norwood).' 17 7  The minority-proposed
definition of blight, supported by Senators Pine and Grendell, provides an
objective, statewide standard that is in accordance with the history and tradition
of private property rights in Ohio.
178
Under the minority definition of blight, private property would be secure
against eminent domain abuse in three significant ways. First, the various
qualifications confine the definition of "blighted property" to property that
essentially offends the public safety, health, and welfare. 179 For example, the
proposed definition limits blighted property to "a public nuisance ... fire
hazard or [a condition] otherwise dangerous to the safety of persons or property
... vacant or unimproved lot... property [that] has tax delinquencies that
exceed the value of the property ... property poses a direct threat to public
health or safety ... [and any] abandoned property."' 180
In contrast, the majority definition states that property is blighted if it fits
two or more of the following conditions: "age and obsolescence; non-
compliance with building, housing or other codes; excessive dwelling unit
density; overcrowding of buildings on the land; [and any] faulty lot layout."' 8'1
Based upon this broad definition, the property at issue in Norwood would
qualify as a blighted area because of a lack of compliance with codes, faulty lot
layout, and sheer age of the property. Thus, the majority definition is not only
contrary to the ruling in Norwood, but also offends the very foundation of
private property rights in Ohio. 1
82
Second, the minority proposal includes a restrictive definition of "blighted
area" to ensure that heterogeneous areas that may have spot blight are not
appropriated as a whole community. 183 The provision states that a blighted area
177. LEGIS. TASK FORCE, supra note 166. (Sen. Grendell's letter to the task force as included
in the Final Report).
178. See id. at Attachment 3. (Minority recommendation, RC 126-3899).
179. LEGIS. TASK FORCE, supra note 166, § 1.08(A)(1)-(9).
180. Id.
181. LEGIS. TASK FORCE, supra note 166, at Attachment 2, § 1.08(B)(2)(a)-(q) (Majority
recommendation, R-126-3937).
182. See generally OHIO CONST. of 1851; Omo CONST of 1802; NORTHWEST ORDINANCE OF
1787; U.S. CONST. (1789).
183. LEGIS. TASK FORCE, supra note 166, at Attachment 3 § 1.08(B).
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is "a contiguous area in which over ninety per cent of all properties are blighted
properties."184 In contrast, the majority proposal provides that a blighted area is
"an area in which at least fifty per cent of the parcels are blighted parcels."' 85
In addition to the lax requirements under the majority proposal that define a
blighted parcel, there is no real limitation on finding that at least fifty percent of
the property in the area is blighted because there is no requirement that the
blighted area is contiguous. 8 6 Therefore, the majority position fails to reign in
the definition of blight to prevent abuses of eminent domain power, while the
minority position promotes a strict meaning of blight and blighted area that is
consistent with the natural rights recognized in the Ohio Constitution and
throughout the Western Legal Tradition.
Finally, the minority recommendation provides a section that specifically
addresses the issue of taking private property for private purposes. In section
1.63.xx, subsection A, the minority proposal states the following:
(A) No property that a state agency acquires by eminent domain may
be used for any private commercial enterprise, economic
development, or any other private use unless that property is
conveyed or leased to one of the following:
(1) A private entity that is a public utility or common carrier;
(2) A private entity that occupies an incidental area within a
publicly owned and occupied project;
(3) A private entity when the condition of the property at the time
of the taking poses an existing threat to public health and safety and
the entity that is taking the property by eminent domain establishes
by clear and convincing evidence that the property is a blighted
property as defined in section 1.08 of the Revised Code.1
87
Even though the minority position creates exceptions to taking private property
for private use, the majority position fails to even mention a limitation of any
sort on appropriations for private use. 88 One possible conclusion maintains
that the majority position fails to state a limitation on private appropriation as a
direct response to the holding in Norwood. Though this omission may be in
accord with the current status of case law, the failure to explicitly limit such
takings in a constitutional amendment leaves the door wide open for takings of
184. Id.
185. LEGIS. TAsK FORCE, supra note 166, at Attachment 2 §1.08(A)(1).
186. Id.
187. Id. at Attachment 3 §l.63.xx(A)(1)-(3).
188. Id. (specifically the Majority Report).
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private property for private use, if a future decision abandons the precedent
established by Norwood.
The unanimous decision in Norwood provides the support and constitutional
authority for the Ohio General Assembly to narrowly define blight.'89
Unfortunately, the General Assembly failed to adopt the minority position, a
decision that may result in Kelo-type takings across the state of Ohio in the near
future. 190
IV. CONCLUSION
Though most citizens of Ohio are probably unaware of the potential
implications of Senate Bill 167 and the current code provision,191 it is clear that
Senator Tim Grendell's proposed definition of blight is not only aptly suited to
protect the interests of private property owners, but also is in accord with the
historical foundations of private property rights in Ohio. The Founders of the
United States, in drawing on these historical bases, recognized the right to own
property as a fundamental right that should only be tread upon for the public
use, not for the general welfare, private gain, or even economic gain for the
municipal, state, or federal government.
Thus, regardless of whether one adheres to Locke's notion of private
property ownership as a natural right, or Blackstone's societal conventions, the
American view of private property rights, as based in the Western Legal
Tradition, is clear and unambiguous. Madison, Jefferson, and Locke all held
private property rights to be among those that are natural and inherent in
mankind.192 Having modeled the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 and the various
189. See discussion supra, Part II.
190. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 303.26. This definition clearly supports the majority position.
The provision states,
"Blighted area" means an area within a county but outside the corporate limits of
any municipality, which are by reason of the presence of a substantial number of
slum, deteriorated, or deteriorating structures, predominance of defective or
inadequate street layout, faulty lot layout in relation to size, adequacy,
accessibility, or usefulness, insanitary or unsafe conditions, deterioration of site or
other improvements, diversity of ownership, tax or special assessment delinquency
exceeding the fair value of the land, defective or unusual conditions to title, or the
existence of conditions which endanger life or property by fire and other causes, or
any combination of such factors, substantially impairs or arrests the sound growth
of a county, retards the provision of housing accommodations, or constitutes an
economic or social liability and is a menace to the public health, safety, morals, or
welfare in its present condition and use. Id. (emphasis added).
191. Id.
192. See discussion supra, Part III, at Section A.
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versions of the Ohio Constitution on those principles, it is imperative that
Ohioans not abandon the very foundation on which their rights as citizens are
based. Unfortunately, the majority proposed definition of blight and section
303.26 of the current code, fail to understand and appreciate the danger of
departing too far from the foundation. Therefore, the Ohio General Assembly
should re-examine Senator Tim Grendell's proposed minority definition of
blight to prevent the further expansion of eminent domain powers by the state.
On a final note, while both the court in Norwood and the legislature
recognized that Kelo-type takings were not supported in the organic laws of
Ohio, neither body took the necessary steps to enforce Article 1, § 19 of the
Ohio Constitution. Thus, it should be no surprise there will be another
Norwood that will bring this issue back into the public discourse. Perhaps this
brief exposition and analysis will inform the courts, legislature, and citizens of
Ohio of their own history so that when future debate arises, the necessary
individuals will be equipped to act within the laws of nature and in accord with
the wisdom of our founders.
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